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INTRODUCTION
Under current precedent, the Sixth Amendment's Impartiality Clause'
requires that venires for criminal juries be fairly cross-sectional over time.
Following Duren v. Missouri, criminal defendants can argue that: (1) a "group
alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group"; (2) the group is
underrepresented, meaning that its long-term representation in the relevant
jurisdiction's venires is not "fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community"; and (3) "this underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion" - that is, exclusion "inherent in the particular jury-
selection process utilized."'3 Once these three prongs have been satisfied, a
prima facie fair cross section (FCS) claim has been established, at which point
the government must justify the underrepresentation by citing a "significant
state interest," or the defendant is entitled to a new trial.4
This well-worked-out schema supplies the hinge on which two opposing
conceptions of the criminal jury's legitimacy might swing into law.'
Demographic conceptions maintain that a jury's legitimacy depends in part on
its composition. On this view, jury venires are fairly cross-sectional when they
possess particular traits sufficiently - that is, fairly-in proportion to the larger
population, such that defendants have a "fair possibility" of being judged by a
representative jury.6 By contrast, an enfranchisement conception emphasizes
democratic participation. On this alternative approach, a jury system is fairly
cross-sectional when all eligible people have been given adequate-that is,
fair- opportunity to participate in jury service, regardless of how
demographically representative the resulting venires or juries may be. While
demographic approaches are favored by the Supreme Court, enfranchisement
conceptions appear only fleetingly in early FCS cases and, more recently, near
the margins of lower court opinions.
In this Note, I argue that an enfranchisement conception of jury legitimacy
better explains contemporary FCS doctrine and, indeed, central features of
contemporary jury practice. Moreover, an enfranchisement conception is
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed....").
2. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-66 (1979).
. Id.
4. Id. at 367-68.
5. Hereinafter my use of "jury" refers to criminal petit juries.
6. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528
(1975).
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RE-JUSTIFYING THE FAIR CROSS SECTION REQUIREMENT
normatively superior in that it is consistent with values underlying the
American criminal jury, whereas demographic conceptions are not. An
enfranchisement conception of jury legitimacy should therefore supplant the
demographic rationales for FCS doctrine currently enshrined in Supreme
Court precedent.
The stakes in this debate are substantial, and not just because FCS doctrine
remains a frequently litigated issue in criminal law. Any investigation into the
FCS requirement leads quickly to larger debates about the meaning of juror
impartiality, the legality of affirmative action in jury selection, and the role of
the jury in American democracy. The choice between demographic and
enfranchisement conceptions of jury legitimacy is therefore of fundamental
constitutional importance.
My argument proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes demographic
conceptions of the jury's legitimacy and criticizes them on both legal and
normative grounds. Next, drawing on historical sources and voting law, Part II
proposes and defends an enfranchisement conception of jury legitimacy that
avoids the pitfalls associated with demographic approaches. Part III then
argues that this enfranchisement conception best explains and justifies FCS
doctrine's metes and bounds. Finally, Part IV discusses the important case
United States v. Green7 and recent reforms in the District of Massachusetts in
order to bring an enfranchisement approach to bear on issues at the forefront
of jury law and policy.
I. DEMOGRAPHIC CONCEPTIONS OF JURY LEGITIMACY
The Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that the composition of a
given petit jury is relevant to its legitimacy. Most famously, Ballard v. United
States held that both sexes possess "a flavor, a distinct quality" relevant to jury
deliberations.8 Similarly, in Peters v. Kif a plurality held that the exclusion of
particular groups "deprives the jury of a perspective on human events."9 These
statements support what I call demographic conceptions of jury legitimacy.
When a demographic conception is realized, the individuals making up a given
petit jury appropriately reflect the demographic composition of the overall
population. On this view, the goal of the FCS requirement (which applies only
7. 389 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. Mass. 2005).
8. 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946).
9. 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972); see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 533.
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to venires over time) is to provide each criminal defendant with a "fair
possibility" of being judged by a demographically representative petit jury."°
Of course, given the jury's small size and the enormous diversity of modern
American society, proponents of demographic conceptions must differentiate
and prioritize among different characteristics. A jury might run afoul of
demographic representativeness by lacking African-Americans, men,
Democrats, millionaires, and so on, but only a finite number of these categories
can be represented in a twelve-person jury. The need to prioritize among
mutually exclusive conceptions of jury diversity gives rise to a variety of
demographic conceptions, each one reflecting a particular understanding of fair
representation.
In this Part, I criticize demographic conceptions of jury legitimacy as
inconsistent with contemporary jury law and practice. Section A discusses the
benefits that courts and scholars ascribe to demographic proportionality.
Section B then argues that demographic conceptions of jury legitimacy are
incompatible with FCS doctrine's limitations, contemporary criminal jury
practice, equal protection jurisprudence, the jury's function as an impartial
decision-making institution, and the Supreme Court's aversion to essentialist
jurisprudence.
A. Demography's Legitimizing Benefits
Demographic conceptions are typically defended with reference to three
types of benefits, which I call participatory, perceptional, and correlative.
Participatory and perceptional benefits are best considered as a pair. The
former accrue when jury service influences jurors in a way that ultimately
redounds to society's advantage, while the latter arise when jury service
increases public confidence in the legitimacy of verdicts. Participatory benefits
have historically been understood to emerge simply from an individual's
inclusion in a jury, regardless of that jury's demographic makeup. l' The link
between participatory benefits and demographic conceptions of jury legitimacy
is comparatively recent, based on studies indicating that women who have
1o. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
ii. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 93-94 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, THE BIL OF
RIGHTS]; ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVITLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Literary Classics 2004) (1835) ("[T]he jury .. is also the most effective means of teaching
the people how to rule."); Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to
Voting, 8o CORNELL L. REV. 203, 218-20 (1995) [hereinafter Amar, Jury Service]; see also John
Gastil et al., Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the Connection Between Jury
Deliberation and Political Participation, 64 J. POL. 585 (2002).
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served on diverse juries tend to have more confidence in the trial process.'2 By
contrast, perceptional benefits are traditionally associated with demographic
diversity."3 Critics have long highlighted the apparent illegitimacy of verdicts
rendered by homogenous juries, especially in racially charged cases.' 4 More
recently, empirical studies indicate that the public generally has more
confidence in verdicts rendered by diverse juries."5 Demographic conceptions
grounded in either participatory or perceptional benefits are united in
instrumentalizing criminal justice. That is, instead of arguing that jury
diversity contributes to just or accurate verdicts, perceptional and participatory
accounts view jury diversity as a means of promoting other social goals, such as
the system's perceived legitimacy.
Correlative benefits, by contrast, directly focus on the jury's fundamental
mission of dispensing individualized justice, and so merit special attention.
Correlative arguments suggest that "descriptively" representative juries also
tend to be "substantively" representative. 6 That is, juries with members who
exhibit certain traits in proportion to the larger population (descriptive
representation) are believed to be more likely to render decisions that accord
with the larger population's unarticulated interests (substantive
12. See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice, and Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 659, 692 (2002)
("There were significant effects of diversity by gender and age, but not race, on jurors'
satisfaction with the jury deliberations, the jury experience, and the verdict.").
13. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 ("Community participation in the administration of the criminal
law . . . [is] critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.");
HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY Box: AFFIRMATVE ACTION IN
JURY SELECTION 73-76 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 704 (1995) ("Few
statements are more likely to evoke disturbing images of American criminal justice than this
one: 'The defendant was tried by an all-white jury."').
is. See Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering
and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1033 (2003); Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl
Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and
Affirmative Juries of the Hennepin Model and the Jury de Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y
& L. 645, 663 (1997) (discussing a randomized survey of residents of Santa Cruz County,
California, in which "67.3% of respondents agreed that 'Decisions reached by racially diverse
juries are more fair than decisions reached by single race juries"'); Nancy J. King, The Effects
of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An
Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1177 (1994).
16. This claim draws on a political science vocabulary that has developed in the context of
electoral representation. See, e.g., HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION (1967); Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women
Represent Women?A Contingent "Yes," 61 J. POL. 628 (1999).
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representation).17 Correlative arguments can be understood as efforts to
compensate for the fact that jurors, unlike most community representatives, are
neither elected nor appointed. Consequently, jurors are not institutionally
tethered to the populace on whose behalf they speak. Because no accountability
mechanisms constrain jury decision-making, the argument might go, jurors
should at least be chosen according to demographic criteria that increase the
likelihood of substantive representation.
Arguments connecting descriptive representation to correlative benefits
generally fall into one of two categories: single-viewpoint and multiple-
viewpoint accounts. Single-viewpoint accounts assert that a particular idea or
perspective must be included in any jury for the resulting verdict to be
legitimate. For instance, Ballard suggested that a jury lacking women would
inevitably also lack an important outlook on human experience that might
prove relevant during deliberations. 8  Multiple-viewpoint accounts, by
contrast, hold that the espousal of a particular viewpoint is less important than
having an array of dissimilar views that enrich the quality of deliberations.' 9
The presence of several different outlooks may better catalyze critical reflection,
yielding what the Court has sometimes termed "diffused impartiality."2 More
17. See Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the
Sixth Amendment, 1o6 YALE L.J. 93, 144 (1996) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment requires
community representation on the petit jury not just for its educative or political value, but
also because representation contributes crucially to the reliability of criminal verdicts."
(footnote omitted)).
18. See 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982);
Susan Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, in TRIAL AND ERROR: AN OxFoRD ANTHOLOGY OF LEGAL
STORIES 139 (Fred R. Shapiro & Jane Garry eds., 1998); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the
Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1893 (2005) ("[T]he Glaspell story leads directly to a legal
proposition- that women might be entitled to a 'jury of their peers' because men and
women might reason differently about moral or legal guilt.").
19. See Alschuler, supra note 14, at 736 (arguing that minority representation "might promote
the expression of diverse viewpoints in the jury room and enhance the quality of jury
deliberations"); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (accepting empirical evidence
that five-person juries would generate unduly truncated deliberations and would silence
minority perspectives); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV.
L. REv. 1261 (2000) (arguing that empirical evidence supports elevating the unanimity
requirement to a constitutional rule).
2o. E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 134 (1994) (citing Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Ballew, 435 U.S. at 233 (citing jury
studies indicating that "prejudices of individuals were frequently counterbalanced");
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and
Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 997 (2003)
(discussing mock jury studies indicating that racially diverse juries deliberate more
thoroughly and efficaciously).
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recently, the Court's invocation of academic diversity in Grutter v. Bollinger21
has given hope to those who would support measures to ensure that juries also
contain a critical mass of minority voices.' Thus, in single-viewpoint accounts
the correlative benefit accrues from the inclusion of a particular view (or
views), whereas in multiple-viewpoint accounts the benefit arises from the
difference between two (or more) included views. Both approaches rest on
judgments regarding the similarities and differences among various jurors'
attitudes and outlooks.
B. Demography's Detractions
Whatever the virtues of promoting jury diversity as a matter of policy, legal
arguments founded on demographic conceptions of jury legitimacy encounter
at least five pitfalls. Specifically, demographic conceptions are in conflict with
the limits of FCS doctrine, the demands of equal protection jurisprudence,
established jury practice, the value of jury impartiality, and the law's aversion
to essentialist jurisprudence. As a result, those who support a more
representative jury should seek an alternative legitimizing theory.23
1. Inapplicability to Petit Juries
Demographic conceptions of jury legitimacy undermine the coherence of
FCS doctrine by forcing it to confront an apparent mismatch between the
21. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
22. See John J. Francis, Peremptory Challenges, Grutter, and Critical Mass: A Means of Reclaiming
the Promise ofBatson, 29 VT. L. REV. 297, 300 (2005) (describing "a proposal to apply Grutter
to the jury selection process"); Joshua Wilkenfeld, Newly Compelling: Reexamining Judicial
Construction of Juries in the Aftermath of Grutter v. Bollinger, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2291
(2004).
23. Heather Gerken has suggested a novel defense of current FCS doctrine that avoids many
shortcomings associated with traditional demographic approaches. In short, Gerken has
argued that FCS violations impinge on a social good -namely, the expected frequency with
which minority groups command controlling majorities in petit juries. See Heather K.
Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARv. L. REV. lo99 (2005). Yet Gerken's approach does
not provide a suitable legal justification for FCS doctrine. In essence, Gerken has suggested
that inconsistency in jury outcomes ought to be tolerated (or even celebrated) because such
inconsistency will generate certain participatory and perceptional benefits. As Gerken herself
has acknowledged, this defense depends on the unattractive premise that impartiality ought
to be sacrificed for social policy. See id. at 1166 ("[O]ur normative vision of the court, and
thus the jury, as an 'impartial' decisionmaker runs directly contrary to the argument ... that
we ought to value the fact that different juries will render different verdicts in similar
cases.").
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scope of the FCS requirement and its justification. According to current
precedent, the Sixth Amendment requires cross-sectionality among venires
over time but does not require cross-sectionality in any particular jury.24 Yet a
demographic conception of jury legitimacy would suggest that the cross-
sectionality guarantee should extend from the venire to each petit jury. Indeed,
if FCS doctrine is truly concerned with a defendant's right to an impartial jury,
and if demographic proportionality is the means to achieve impartiality, then it
is difficult to imagine why cross-sectionality might be essential to the venires
from which petit juries are chosen but irrelevant to the verdict-rendering juries
themselves. 2' Even the Sixth Amendment's textual reference to the "jury" as
opposed to the venire seems to confirm the intuition that venires are mere
means to the end of selecting petit juries.
The Court and other defenders of the status quo FCS doctrine usually
respond by invoking necessity: given that perfect cross-sectionality is
impossible in any group of twelve jurors, defendants are entitled only to a "fair
possibility," and not a guarantee, of a representative jury. 6 Yet if the Court
truly viewed a representative jury as the ideal outcome, it could extend the
cross-sectionality requirement to individual petit juries in a loosened,
practically obtainable form. The Court might hold that FCS claims could be
brought based on protracted underrepresentation of distinctive groups in petit
juries, and not just venires. Alternatively, the Court could limit the cross-
sectionality requirement to those groups whose proportional representation
could easily be achieved, such as women. In fact, however, the Court has held
that FCS doctrine does not apply to the composition of petit juries
24. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) ("[W]e impose no requirement that petit
juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups
in the population.").
25. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 372 n.* (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[I]f 'that
indefinable something' [associated with female jurors] were truly an essential element of the
due process right to trial by an impartial jury, a defendant would be entitled to a jury
composed of men and women in perfect proportion to their numbers in the community.");
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 369-71 (1999); Gerken, supra note 23, at 1115
("[A]Imost any theory that would explain why we care about a pool that mirrors the
population would also favor a jury that does the same.").
26. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74
(1986) ("[T]he limited scope of the fair-cross-section requirement is a direct and inevitable
consequence of the practical impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly
'representative' petit jury .. "); RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 119
(2003); Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1658, 1696-97 (2000).
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whatsoever.2 7 Recognizing the mismatch between the Court's theory and its
holdings, some have argued that the Sixth Amendment's cross-sectionality
guarantee should extend to individual petit juries.28  FCS doctrine's
contradictions thus serve as a foothold for supporters of affirmative action in
petit jury selection.
2. Incompatibility with Equal Protection Jurisprudence
A second, related doctrinal puzzle results from the interaction between the
FCS requirement and equal protection jurisprudence. Batson v. Kentucky and its
progeny prohibited peremptory strikes on the basis of race and gender, 9
thereby suggesting that both are illegitimate bases for establishing suitability
for jury service. Yet the Court's demographic approach to justifying FCS
doctrine appears to rest on the benefits that purportedly accrue from the
inclusion of members of various racial groups and both sexes in petit juries.3"
These countervailing doctrines place courts in the strange predicament of
insisting under Batson that there is no legally acceptable reason for parties -
including defendants - to influence juries' racial composition, while
simultaneously throwing out convictions on FCS grounds because of racially
skewed jury pools.31 Indeed, the Equal Protection Clause precludes many
27. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (refusing to apply FCS doctrine to petit juries);
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (holding that the FCS requirement does not guarantee that petit
juries be "of any particular composition"). But see Holland, 493 U.S. at 498 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("A 'dispassionate analysis' of our cases . .. thus makes clear that fair-cross-
section principles do apply to the petit jury."); Muller, supra note 17, at 140.
28. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of
Affirmative Action injury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 707 (1993) (discussing jury affirmative
action proposals, including guaranteeing a certain number of jurors of the defendant's race).
29. See 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
30. See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REv.
2001, 2016 (1998) ("On the one hand, particularly in the fair cross-section cases, the Court
has suggested that race and sex matter both because they might influence individual jurors'
perspectives and because the behavior of a jury as a whole might be affected by its racial and
sexual composition. On the other hand, the Court has been equally insistent that
stereotypical assumptions about jurors' attitudes are both unjustified and unjustifiable."
(footnote omitted)).
31. See Amar, jury Service, supra note ii, at 21o; Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury
Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 94S, 965 (1998) ("A defendant
is thus placed in a strange position: he is entitled to a jury drawn from a fair cross section
specifically because it increases the odds that different groups and perspectives will be
represented in the jury pool, which in turn helps ensure that the panel is impartial; when
actually seating a jury, however, he may not take those same characteristics into account.").
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obvious remedies for FCS violations. For example, one way to rectify a racially
unrepresentative jury system would be to modify the selection process to afford
members of the underrepresented racial group an increased probability of
being selected for petit jury service." Such remedies have in fact been
attempted, only to be struck down by circuit courts on equal protection
grounds. 3
The problem would become even more acute if, in accordance with
demographic ideals, the FCS requirement were extended to petit juries. Direct
remediation of FCS violations through racially preferential selection at the petit
jury stage is incompatible with Batson; thus, the most effective means of
implementing an extended FCS requirement would be prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment.34 As the doctrine currently stands, this direct conflict
between the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is averted by the Court's
insistence that the FCS requirement applies only to venires. In other words, the
Court's unexplained refusal to extend the FCS requirement to petit juries
obscures and forestalls a latent inconsistency between the FCS requirement and
equal protection jurisprudence.
3. Intrajurisdictional and Interjurisdictional Diversity
More broadly, demographic conceptions of jury legitimacy are inconsistent
with important features of the law governing contemporary juror selection.
American criminal juries exhibit what I call intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional diversity. Intrajurisdictional diversity refers to the fact that
any given jurisdiction experiences a distribution of venire compositions over
time as a result of the deliberately randomized process of juror selection. By
contrast, interjurisdictional diversity refers to the fact that each jurisdiction
contains a demographically distinctive population; thus, a frequent or median
jury composition in one locale could be anomalous or nonexistent in another.
32. See John P. Bueker, Note, Jury Source Lists: Does Supplementation Really Work?, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 390, 430 (1997) ("Thus, the Court finds itself in a 'catch-22.' To be true to its race-
blind approach, the Court must invalidate stratified sampling. But, the Court must uphold
the practice if it wants to protect a criminal defendant's... Sixth Amendment rights.").
33. See, e.g., United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3 d 1o92 (6th Cir. 1998) (striking down the Eastern
District of Michigan's policy of removing nonblack citizens from master jury wheels so as to
achieve proportionate representation of African-Americans); see also Andrew J. Lievense,
Fair Representation on Juries in the Eastern District of Michigan: Analyzing Past Efforts and
Recommending Future Action, 38 U. MCH. J.L. REFORM 941 (2005).
34. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) ("[I]f race stereotypes are
the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of
the Constitution."); Ellis & Diamond, supra note 15, at 1o51.
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Defendants accused of identical crimes might therefore be tried by juries of
every imaginable composition, depending on the venire they happen to draw
and the jurisdiction in which they are tried, or both. This fact represents a
grave injustice if, consistent with demographic approaches, some jury
compositions are legally superior to others. Yet FCS doctrine condones these
variations by requiring defendants to demonstrate underrepresentation both
over time (thereby permitting intrajurisdictional diversity)" and within the
jurisdiction in which they are tried (thereby permitting interjurisdictional
diversity)? 6 Demographic conceptions of jury legitimacy thus imply a wide-
ranging criticism of the American criminal justice system.
4. Impartiality: Selected Versus Acquired Competence
Demographic conceptions are also in tension with the Sixth Amendment's
impartiality guarantee. The jury is unique among governmental institutions in
that its legitimacy hinges almost exclusively on impartiality as opposed to
accountability. This is why there are virtually no constitutional qualifications
for jury service,37 why juries are paid a set wage regardless of the outcome, why
jury deliberations are secret and the reasons for their decisions unrecorded, 38
and why jurors are discharged immediately after rendering their decision
without any special prospect of being invited to return. In the absence of
accountability mechanisms, the legitimacy of jury verdicts depends on the
3S. See Jury Selection and Service Act (JSSA) of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2000) (requiring
random jury selection within federal jurisdictions, albeit limited by geographical
constraints); see also United States v. Ashley, 54 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting an FCS
claim that intrajurisdictional diversity should be remedied by creating new jury districts that
would increase the reliability of black representation in local petit juries); Laura G. Dooley,
The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the Concept of Community, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 109 (2004) ("[T]he values of minority communities are more likely to
be subsumed in juries drawn from larger federal districts than they would be in smaller,
county-based state court juries.").
36. See Engel, supra note 26, at 1702 ("To transfer a trial from the Bronx to Albany distorts the
character of the jury as surely as if the county had excluded women or black jurors from
sitting on the venire. Such changes run afoul of the spirit, if not the letter, of the cross-
section requirement." (footnote omitted)).
37. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12 (1984) ("The constitutional standard [is] that a
juror is impartial only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict based on the
evidence presented in court ... " (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)).
38. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) ("Freedom of debate might be stifled and
independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and
ballots were to be freely published to the world."); Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the jury, 3
WM. & MARY BiLL RTS. J. 29, 53-54 (1994) (discussing the view that the jury's "black box"
character yields "aresponsibility" in order "to protect the independence of the jury").
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jurors' competence-that is, their ability to render accurate verdicts. Yet the
jury relies almost exclusively on "acquired" as opposed to "selected"
competence: jurors acquire the information necessary to render legitimate
verdicts after assuming their posts, from the trial evidence, the judge's legal
instructions, and their own reasoned deliberations. 39 This focus on acquired
competence ensures that jurors are not beholden to the appointing government
agent and prevents the government from selecting decision-makers who are
predisposed to favor particular positions.
Demographic conceptions suggest a greater role for selected competence by
focusing on the benefits generated by including particular group members in
petit juries. In so doing, demographic conceptions take a step away from
impartiality. At the extreme, a perfect understanding of the relationship
between group membership and jury deliberations would permit jury-
reforming officials to influence verdicts by changing the input of juror group
membership. But the problem obtains even if proponents of demographic
conceptions posit only a few social scientific findings, such as that increased
jury diversity yields more extensive and, consequently, more accurate jury
deliberations. Accepting this rationale would constitute a legal acknowledgement
of the government's ability-and duty-to manage jurors as a means of
achieving desirable verdicts. This doctrinal move would emphasize the
government's role in constructing optimal juries, at the expense of the jury's
independent capacity to determine the facts. Thus, demographic conceptions
would corrode the law's doctrinal commitment to jury impartiality.
5. EssentialistJuty Selection
Finally, by highlighting an essentializing connection between group
membership and jury verdicts, demographic conceptions would establish a
principle of juror partisanship precisely when neutrality is called for most. This
concern is usually expressed in perceptional terms. Programs to increase the
representation of certain demographic groups might encourage jurors to think
of themselves as representatives of interest-bound constituencies, thereby
corroding their commitment to disinterested deliberation. 4' The same policies
39. Cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA's CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 325 (2005) ("Twelve private
citizens who simply got together on their own to announce the guilt of a fellow citizen
would not be a lawful jury, but a lynch mob.").
40. SeeJEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 140 (2000) (arguing that jurors selected on account of
their race "would be less prepared to enter into the kind of independent and impartial
deliberations that historically have differentiated jury behavior from voting behavior"). But
see Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal To Advance Both the Deliberative
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might also undermine the public's confidence that the criminal justice system is
capable of generating verdicts that reflect individualized justice as opposed to
political outcomes dictated by interest-based voting.4 '
These perceptional and partiality concerns signal deeper doctrinal
problems. Even if (somehow) neither jurors nor the public knew that jury
affirmative action was taking place, demographic conceptions would still
legally enshrine associations between group membership and individual
attitudes that are, at best, contextual and ever-changing. This essentialism can
be found in both single- and multiple-viewpoint accounts. Indeed, multiple-
viewpoint accounts are arguably more essentializing, as they rest not only on
assumptions regarding individual groups, but also on relative judgments that
certain groups hold views that are similar or dissimilar to the views of others.
Shifting Court majorities have eschewed similar essentialist premises in the
related contexts of jury selection and electoral districting. 42 By taking the
opposite tack, demographic conceptions run afoul of the spirit, if not the letter,
of these precedents.
II. AN ENFRANCHISEMENT CONCEPTION OF JURY LEGITIMACY
The enfranchisement conception I propose holds that the jury is legitimate
to the extent that it enfranchises eligible participants. Thus, following the
democratic values rhetoric in seminal FCS cases, jury service can be likened to
Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 173 (suggesting a policy whereby neither
the jurors nor "the parties would be unable to discern which jurors were affirmatively
selected and which were chosen randomly").
41. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 243-45 (1997); Eric M. Albritton, Race-
Conscious Grand Juror Selection: The Equal Protection Clause and Strict Scrutiny, 31 AM. J.
CRiM. L. 175, 212 (2003) ("[S]tamping with legitimacy the position that race affects jury
verdicts will not increase legitimacy, but rather decrease legitimacy of verdicts."); Barbara
D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 725, 733 (1992) ("A race-based generalization about the likely views of jurors
cannot lawfully be the basis for any legal rule."); Andrew Kull, Racial Justice: Trial by Cross-
Section, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 17, 20 (objecting to the view that "a person can
neither represent another's interests effectively nor judge him fairly unless he is of the same
race").
42. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995) (emphasizing that equal protection
jurisprudence "forbids" governmental reliance on "stereotypical assumptions"); Shaw v.
Reno, 5o9 U.S. 630, 647-48 (1993) (exhibiting concern about "perpetuating" stereotypical
notions about racial groups, particularly stereotypes that racial group members "think
alike"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause
prohibits a State from taking any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes ....").
1581
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the electoral franchise.43 The legitimacy of an election does not depend on
whether actual voters descriptively represent the set of eligible voters, but
rather on whether the electorate was afforded an adequate opportunity to
participate in the electoral process. Similarly, jury legitimacy does not depend
on the participation of a descriptively representative sample of the set of
eligible jurors, but rather on eligible jurors' fair opportunity to be called for
service. On this view, the second Duren prong requiring substantial
underrepresentation has only diagnostic value, in that the relative absence of an
identifiable group signals that disenfranchisement- the real constitutional
evil-is taking place. My argument is divided into three sections. Section A
argues that jury service constitutes a distinctive form of suffrage and that FCS
doctrine helps ensure equal access to that franchise. Section B then argues that
criminal defendants have an impartiality interest in a democratic jury, thereby
connecting jury enfranchisement to the Sixth Amendment. Finally, Section C
demonstrates that an enfranchisement conception of jury legitimacy avoids
demographic conceptions' shortcomings.
A. Conceptualizing Jury (Dis)Enfranchisement
An enfranchisement conception of jury legitimacy begins by assessing the
similarities between voting and jury service. As scholars including Akhil and
Vikram Amar have shown, this comparison has an ancient heritage. 44 At the
Founding, jurors and voters were conceptualized as complementary legislators,
with the latter shaping the criminal law's construction and the former its
43. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("Community participation in the
administration of the criminal law... [is] consistent with our democratic heritage ....");
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (concluding that "systematic" exclusion
constitutes an "injury... to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts");
Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223, 225 (1946) (holding that when the "democratic nature
of the jury system" is impinged, "it becomes unnecessary to determine whether the
petitioner was in any way prejudiced by the wrongful exclusion"); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 6o, 85 (1942) ("Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony
with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government."); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (holding that racial juror exclusion "is at war with our
basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government").
44. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note ii, at 94-96; Amar, Jury Service, supra note 11, at
253-54; see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 293 (1997) ("If the rights to [electoral] representation and to trial by
jury were left to operate in full force, they would shelter nearly all the other rights and
liberties of the people.").
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application and, therefore, its local definition. 4' Today, it remains axiomatic
that every criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to be judged by "a
jury of his peers. ',46 The Court has emphasized that the jury is a democratic
institution, holding in Powers v. Ohio that "with the exception of voting, for
most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant
opportunity to participate in the democratic process. '47 More recently, the
Court observed in Blakely v. Washington that "[j]ust as suffrage ensures the
people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is
meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.148
These are not empty slogans. Even when jurors do not consciously
contemplate nullification, statutory terms like "reasonable," "substantial," and
"malicious" invite consideration of social norms and public policy. For
example, when a jury convicts a defendant for reckless conduct, it is deciding-
in a very particular case-what it means to be reckless in its society. And just as
those who feel especially concerned about particular social issues-like gun
control or drug abuse-may express those preferences in the electoral process,
they may also argue more strenuously for the conviction of gun or drug dealers
during jury deliberations. The jury thus parallels the electoral system in
providing a medium through which individuals and groups participate in
democratic governance.
49
Yet "enfranchisement" has a very different meaning in connection with
juries as opposed to elections. Whereas the opportunity to participate in juries
is generated by a complex jury selection process, the government fulfills an
analogous obligation with regard to voting simply by scheduling and
administering accessible elections. This difference stems not from any
constitutional principle, but rather from the logistical necessities of the
criminal justice system: voluntary jury service would not reliably yield an
45. See, e.g., AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note ii, at ioo (quoting Theophilus Parsons's
proclamation during the Massachusetts ratifying convention, "Let [any man] be considered
as a criminal by the general government, yet only his own fellow-citizens can convict him").
46. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (further describing jury service as
"community participation").
47. 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
48. 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (collecting sources from the ratification era).
49. Jury service arguably offers greater opportunities for democratic participation than does
voting. First, the unanimity requirement typically observed in criminal cases ensures that
each juror's vote is potentially decisive in the outcome of every case. Second, each juror's
freedom of speech is enhanced within the context of jury deliberations, which afford a
guaranteed and open-ended opportunity to persuade all other voting parties. So while
individual voters trivially affect decisions of great importance, individual jurors play pivotal
roles in deciding isolated cases.
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adequate number of jurors at the appropriate times." The two institutions
consequently present themselves to prospective participants in very different
ways. As any busy American knows, jurors are called to mandatory service at a
time of the government's choosing. By contrast, voting in the United States is
discretionary, as each voter can choose whether to participate in any number of
set elections. Because of these divergent administrative arrangements, voting is
more easily conceptualized as a right, whereas jury service is usually thought of
as a duty. Still, the Court has recognized that jury service, like all forms of self-
government, is best viewed as both a right and a duty. s"
The jury's greater reliance on state management and its decreased visibility
as compared to elections generate a unique governmental obligation in the
form of third-party standing. Consider the fundamental democratic principle
that each eligible voter should cast an equally weighted vote. This precept's
jury analogue requires that the government extend to each eligible citizen an
equal opportunity to be called for jury service. Yet there are important practical
differences between being called for jury service and casting a ballot. Eligible
voters can be disenfranchised when elections are not publicized in advance,
when voting stations are inaccessible, and when opaque voting procedures
prevent them from expressing their wishes. Jurors, by contrast, can be
disenfranchised much more discreetly when the government persistently
withholds jury summonses. Whereas electoral disenfranchisement is publicly
experienced at a specifiable point in time - that is, at the moment of the
election-jury disenfranchisement is a gradually realized and inconspicuous
phenomenon. Indeed, even well-meaning officials and the disenfranchised
jurors themselves may not be aware that jury disenfranchisement is taking
5o. The JSSA, 28 U.S.C. § 1864(a) (2000), which strives to prevent invidious discrimination by
curtailing government discretion, generally forbids volunteer juries in federal courts. See
United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 6o8, 609 ( 5th Cir. 1977); see also United States v.
Bearden, 659 F.zd 590, 602 ( 5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981) (stating that the "underlying
concern" of the JSSA's randomness requirement is that jury selection "must not result or
have the potential to result in discrimination"). However, state volunteer juries do not
necessarily violate either the JSSA or FCS doctrine, and they are legal in some states. See
United States v. Ramirez, 884 F.2d 1524, 1527-30 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Nelson,
718 F.ud 315, 320 (9th Cir. 1983) (collecting cases); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, at 218-21 (2004) [hereinafter
STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
sc0o4.pdf (providing a table indicating juror qualifications, as well as the source of juror
lists, in every state).
si. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986) (suggesting that any measure that resulted
in total exclusion from jury service would constitute a "substantial deprivation of [a] basic
right[] of citizenship"); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (declining to
decide "[w]hether jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a duty"); Thiel v. S. Pac.
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946) ("Jury service is a duty as well as a privilege of citizenship . .
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place. This detection problem means that normal accountability mechanisms,
like public visibility, are unlikely to be effective in enforcing compliance with
FCS principles. Accordingly, there is a special need to provide third-party
standing to an interested class of people-criminal defendants-who possess a
legal incentive to seek out and draw attention to jury disenfranchisement."2
What can a criminal defendant point to as evidence of jury
disenfranchisement? Because an eligible juror has no legal interest in hearing
any particular case or, indeed, in being called any more regularly than another
juror, the unpredictable and infrequent receipt of summonses is still
compatible with inclusion in the jury franchise. Moreover, not every instance of
individual juror disenfranchisement should rise to the level of constitutional
violation. To be sure, equal protection jurisprudence permits prospective jurors
to challenge their own race- or gender-based exclusion from grand jury or petit
jury service, just as it protects prospective voters from discrimination based on
suspect classifications. s3 However, unintentional, nonsystematic electoral
disenfranchisement typically does not constitute a constitutional violation.54
This rule acknowledges that some forms of electoral disenfranchisement are de
minimis or practically unavoidable and therefore not constitutionally
objectionable. An analogous result is especially appropriate in the jury setting
given the complex and inevitably imperfect administrative bureaucracy
necessary for jury selection. Thus, short-term or isolated cases of juror
exclusion do not suffice to demonstrate jury disenfranchisement. Instead, the
defendant must show that a significant number, or group, of eligible jurors has
been systematically excluded from the jury franchise over time.
B. Enfranchisement and Impartiality
An enfranchisement approach comports with the Sixth Amendment's
impartiality guarantee. True, both demographic and enfranchisement
conceptions accept that people arrive in jury booths bearing diverse experiences
and, therefore, that arbitrary differences among jurors could yield discrepancies
5a. Cf Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (granting third-party standing to criminal defendants bringing
equal protection challenges on behalf of excluded jurors).
53. See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 398 (1998) (upholding equal protection claims
based on racial exclusion from grand juries); Carter, 396 U.S. at 329-30 (petit juries).
s4. See, e.g., Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 198o) ("We must, therefore,
recognize a distinction between state laws and patterns of state action that systematically
deny equality in voting, and episodic events that . . . may result in the dilution of an
individual's vote.").
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between the sentences of similar defendants."5 But whereas demographic
conceptions react by qualifying impartiality through juror management, an
enfranchisement approach reinforces the traditional legal premise that
deliberating jurors can transcend their idiosyncrasies to arrive at a fair
understanding of the case. s6 A parallel can be drawn between the black box of
the jury and the secret ballot. Just as the juror is asked to step outside her
narrow self-interest to pass judgment on a fellow citizen, the voter is invited to
contemplate the public weal. Both the juror and the voter are free to deliberate
and vote in any way that they choose-responsibly, recklessly, or even
maliciously- consistent only with certain minimal institutional requirements.
The legitimacy of these impartial institutions thus depends on the public's faith
in the civic virtues of deliberating citizens.s7
Criminal defendants, like the public at large, also possess an intelligible
impartiality interest in the enfranchisement of eligible jurors. Imagine, for
example, what is often taken as the paradigm case of jury partiality: a black
defendant subjected to a racist all-white jury trial in the Jim Crow South. By
hypothesis, the defendant's jury is not substantively impartial in the legal sense
of being disinterested. This violation is particularly grave because it is sufficient
on its own to establish a false or unjust conviction; the jurors are literally
prejudiced and will decide the case accordingly. But the all-white jury also falls
short of what might be called institutional impartiality in that the government
has limited the set of citizens who can participate in petit juries. This
institutional violation is far more easily demonstrated because skewed jury
selection procedures can be ascertained through witnesses and records,
whereas the secrecy of the jury makes it difficult if not impossible for a
reviewing court to determine whether the jury was substantively prejudiced. As
institutional impartiality is restored, and black jurors are admitted into the jury
system, 8 the biased white majority will have difficulty acting on its prejudices.
55. See JOEL D. LIEBERMAN & BRUCE D. SALES, SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION 57-78 (2007)
(collecting studies on the connection between demographic patterns and juror behavior);
Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review ofJury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects ofJuror Race
on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REv. 63, 77-99 (1993) (collecting studies indicating that
verdicts are influenced by jurors' race, the jury's racial makeup, and the race of both
defendants and their lawyers).
s6. See KENNEDY, supra note 41, at 252; see also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
57. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413,
1485-86 (1991) (suggesting a "restructuring [of] the legislative decisionmaking process on
the model of jury deliberations" because the mission of jurors "is to review the evidence and
decide an outcome that is in the public interest, rather than their self-interest").
58. See Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the
Civil jury, 8o CORNELL L. REV. 325, 325-26 (1995) ("After courts began to interpret
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This interrelationship between substantive and institutional impartiality helps
explain why courts and plaintiffs did not distinguish between the two concepts
while resisting racism and sexism in the jury during the twentieth century.
Yet we can see that a lack of institutional impartiality would constitute a
distinct injury to the defendant and, more generally, to an entire society of
potential defendants. Instead of an impartial arbiter composed of one's peers,
each defendant would confront a tribunal of the government's own creation. 9
Like the jury's more general emphasis on acquired competence, FCS doctrine
helps prevent the government, an interested party, from unduly influencing
the fact-finder's identity.6° In a similar vein, Holland v. Illinois held that when
the government skews the composition of venires, it effectively influences petit
jury compositions without expending any of its valuable peremptory strikes."
Holland thus viewed FCS doctrine as a safeguard against governmental policy
that deliberately or inadvertently "stacks the deck" against the defendant in
what would otherwise be a fair adversarial process.62 If read in the context of
the prevailing demographic approach to FCS doctrine, Holland raises the
question of why the law requires venires to be fairly cross-sectional only over
time and not in every case. After all, the FCS requirement does not prevent
particular venires from being "stacked" against the defendant.
Holland makes more sense when read in light of an enfranchisement
conception of jury legitimacy. Far from being entitled to a fairly composed
venire, a defendant instead deserves an independent, democratic jury. The
relevant institutional impartiality violation therefore occurs not when
particular types of jurors appear in venires while others do not, but rather
when the government exercises control over the jury by excluding eligible
participants. As I discuss in Part IV, group underrepresentation in venires over
time can signal this sort of illicit governmental meddling.
constitutional mandates of equal protection and impartial juries to require that women and
minorities be included on juries, the demographics of juries changed dramatically at a pace
far exceeding the diversification of legislatures, executive branches, or the judiciary.").
sg. Prior to the JSSA, many states employed a "key man" system of jury selection, whereby jury
administrators chose leading citizens or "key men" to serve as jurors. As Randolph Jonakait
has noted, "Most often the nonrandom selection of the jury pool, not surprisingly, aided the
prosecution." JONAKAIT, supra note 26, at 121.
6o. See supra Subsection I.B.4.
61. 493 U.S. 474, 48o-81 (199o).
62. Id. at 481; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314 (1989) ("Because the purpose of the jury
is to guard against arbitrary abuses of power by interposing the commonsense judgment of
the community between the State and the defendant, the jury venire cannot be composed
only of special segments of the population.").
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The connection between enfranchisement and impartiality has two
important implications. First, it provides a plausible basis for limiting FCS
doctrine to venires as opposed to petit juries over time. There would be little
practical difference between these two approaches in the absence of voir dire.
In fact, however, peremptory challenges permit the government to strike
cognizable groups disproportionately in case after case, thereby
disenfranchising jurors and undermining institutional impartiality.63 Yet
peremptories also arguably vindicate the defendant's and the public's interest
in the impartiality of each affected petit jury.64 Linking juror enfranchisement
to jury impartiality thus reframes the debate over the desirability of
peremptory strikes as a disagreement about how to evaluate, balance, and
accommodate these competing impartiality interests.
Second, the connection between enfranchisement and impartiality explains
why criminal defendants-and not systematically excluded jurors-have
standing to bring FCS claims. Drawing on principles of third-party standing,
Section A suggested that criminal defendants are well situated to bring FCS
claims because of their highly particularized interest in victory, as compared to
the diffuse interests of excluded jurors. This conclusion is strengthened by FCS
doctrine's orientation toward impartiality. Whereas exclusionary selection
practices implicate jurors' enfranchisement and equality interests, the skewed
or "partial" juries that result from those practices directly impinge on
defendants' right to an impartial jury. Because only the latter violation sounds
in impartiality, only defendants retain a Sixth Amendment claim.
C. Avoiding Demography's Detractions
An enfranchisement approach avoids the problems associated with
demographic conceptions. First, an enfranchisement approach explains why
FCS doctrine does not extend to individual petit juries, or even to individual
venires. Because only a broad assessment of selection procedures over time can
demonstrate that individuals have been included in (or excluded from) the jury
franchise, no single jury or venire can serve as a useful unit of analysis. Instead,
disenfranchisement must result from systematically exclusionary selection
63. See Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 1169,
1182 (1995).
64. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between
Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 342 (1982) (explaining that the
goal of peremptory challenges is to produce "a jury from which extremes of bias have been
removed").
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practices. Thus, by governing venires over time, FCS doctrine focuses squarely
on the jury as a participatory institution.
Second, an enfranchisement approach harmonizes the doctrine with
contemporary equal protection jurisprudence regarding juries. The Batson line
of cases has generated a constitutional presumption against race- and gender-
based decision-making in jury selection. This premise is reinforced by frequent
assertions that juror competence is a characteristic of individuals, not of
groups, and that any qualified juror is just as competent as any other.6" These
longstanding claims are rendered consistent when FCS doctrine is understood
as a mechanism for democratic inclusion. All jurors, whatever their race or
gender, ought to be included in the jury process and should be excluded, if at
all, only on the basis of individual characteristics.
Third, viewing jury service as enfranchisement clarifies the appropriateness
of permitting interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional diversity. Because an
enfranchisement approach does not depend on the differences between eligible
jurors, neither type of diversity poses any fairness problem. Courts can
therefore consistently insist on juror enfranchisement while countenancing
jury compositions that vary both between and within jurisdictions. Indeed,
interjurisdictional diversity is the jury analogue of the principle that electoral
voters should be permitted to cast ballots only in jurisdictions where they
reside. Just as electoral voters have a special interest in local matters, so too
does a "jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed., 66 Therefore, neither jury nor electoral votes should be diluted by
nonresidents.67
Finally, a focus on enfranchisement avoids the remaining disadvantages
associated with demographic conceptions. An enfranchisement approach does
not challenge the jury's traditional emphasis on acquired as opposed to selected
competence. Nor does it invoke essentialist assumptions regarding group
identity. Instead, as Section III.A outlines, an enfranchisement approach relies
on group membership only as a proxy for, or a means of measuring, the
enfranchisement of individual persons.
65. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) ("Jury competence is an individual rather
than a group or class matter."); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Thiel).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
67. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) (accepting the legitimacy of bona
fide residency requirements for voting); Engel, supra note 26, at 1691 ("By stamping the
community's judgment on the verdict, the local jury legitimizes both the convictions and the
acquittals of criminal defendants.").
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While avoiding these problems, an enfranchisement approach preserves an
important feature of FCS doctrine vis-t-vis its Equal Protection Clause
counterpart- namely, that FCS doctrine does not require intentional
discrimination to be demonstrated, inferred, or even shown to be possible.
This is a tremendous asset. Today, the greatest threats to minority venire
representation are not bigotry or prejudice but administrative neglect,
bureaucratic strain, and political indifference. As Parts III and IV illustrate,
even epochal reforms implemented with the goal of increasing minority
representation can have substantial exclusionary consequences. By offering a
constitutional remedy for such governmental shortcomings, FCS doctrine
helps to honor our constitutional order's abiding commitment to democracy in
the jury booth.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE DOCTRINE'S HEARTLAND: THE THREE
DUREN PRONGS
The preceding Part argued that an enfranchisement approach to FCS
doctrine solves several of the salient problems associated with demographic
conceptions of jury legitimacy. This Part explores the full explanatory power of
an enfranchisement approach by examining how it operates within the three
interrelated Duren prongs, which require the identification of a distinctive
group, a showing that the group is substantially underrepresented, and
evidence that the underrepresentation results from systematic exclusion. I
argue that the metes and bounds of each prong of the Duren test are best
explained by an enfranchisement conception of jury legitimacy. Yet even as an
enfranchisement approach clarifies poorly understood precedent, it also casts
Duren's principles in a new and potentially unflattering light. My exploration
of the Duren prongs thus not only demarcates FCS doctrine's heartland, but
also points toward its frontiers.
A. Distinctive Groups: Age and Permanence
As Vikram Amar has noted, "[A]ny workable theory of jury exclusion must,
at a minimum, explain which groups count and why."68 The Supreme Court
has provided a working answer to this question by entertaining FCS challenges
based on the exclusion of women, African-Americans, and Hispanics .69 Lower
courts have supplied a more general answer by requiring FCS claims to be
68. Amar, Jury Service, supra note ii, at 209.
69. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (collecting cases).
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founded on the underrepresentation of groups that have (i) a "definite
composition," (2) a "basic similarity in attitude, idea, or experience," and (3) a
"community of interest.., such that the group's interests cannot adequately be
represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection process." 70
Unfortunately, this tripartite distinctiveness test has forced courts to engage in
stereotypical and essentialist reasoning. By contrast, an enfranchisement
approach focuses on the disenfranchisement of individuals. On such a view,
FCS doctrine would protect the right to serve on a jury in much the same way
that Fourteenth Amendment "fundamental rights" doctrine prohibits
infringements on the electoral right to vote, regardless of whether those
infringements impinge on suspect classifications.71
Yet an enfranchisement approach is not as irreconcilable with Duren's
distinctive group requirement as it initially appears. Though in principle
disenfranchisement is not necessarily a group injury, there are evidentiary
reasons to organize FCS doctrine around groups as opposed to individuals, and
around groups defined by fixed characteristics as opposed to more ephemeral
traits. Narrowly drawn age-based groups provide a paradigmatic example.
72
Imagine that a faulty jury selection system caused a particular group to be
underrepresented in venires by io% for one year. Would these facts constitute
disenfranchisement? As we will see in more detail in the following Sections, if
the group were African-Americans, then the answer would be "yes." The facts
asserted demonstrate that a significant number of eligible jurors had not been
afforded a substantially equal opportunity to serve on juries. Yet these same
facts would not support a finding of significant disenfranchisement if the
excluded group were nineteen-year-olds. As the year progressed, the excluded
nineteen-year-olds would increasingly become fully included twenty-year-olds.
Consequently, many of those included in the ostensibly formidable lO% figure
would in fact be included in the jury franchise during the specified time period.
By contrast, protracted underrepresentation of permanent traits, like race or
gender, would necessarily indicate the disenfranchisement of individuals, and
not just of groups. An enfranchisement approach thus explains courts'
7o. E.g., United States v. Green, 435 F.3d 1265, 1271 (ioth Cir. 2006) (collecting cases).
71. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding that
limitations on the franchise merit heightened scrutiny even if those limitations do not
employ suspect classifications).
72. Broadly drawn age groups could supply evidence of individual disenfranchisement.
Whereas the category of twenty-year-olds replaces a large percentage of its overall
membership every month, the category of, say, twenty- to thirty-year-olds is relatively
stable. Cf. Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 987 n.8 (1st Cir.) (indicating that the court "would
be far less likely" to remedy discrimination against "age-groups with fairly small age
spans"), vacated en banc, 772 F.2d 996 (lst. Cir. 1985).
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approval of FCS claims based on groups, such as African-Americans and
women, that are separately protected under equal protection jurisprudence.
An enfranchisement approach conversely provides a compelling
explanation for courts' tendency not to accept FCS claims based on transient
characteristics, such as being a new community resident, a parent with a young
child,73 or a renter who has recently changed addresses. 74 Most saliently, courts
have repeatedly and uniformly denied FCS claims on behalf of age-defined
groups 75 even when those groups have been deliberately excluded without
legal authorization. 76 This is a startling pattern, given that age-based groups
satisfy the aforementioned three-part test for distinctiveness at least as well as
racial groups do.77 Individuals of similar age live through the same historical
events, tend to occupy more comparable social and economic positions, and
even share physiological and cognitive traits. Consequently, generational
groups may share a common "attitude, idea, or experience" with even greater
regularity than do members of particular racial groups .78 Further, as an
objective characteristic, age is far more easily regulated by law than race, 79
73. See Hitchcock v. State, 413 So. 2d 741,745 (Fla. 1982).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Hsia, 125 F. Supp. 2d 6, 8 (D.D.C. 2000) ("As the Court has noted
previously, it is unreasonable to categorize undeliverables as persons who affirmatively opt
out of jury service, particularly in such a transitory district as this one.").
75. See United States v. Maxwell, 16o F. 3d 1071, 1075-76 (6th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases);
Johnson v. McCaughtry, 92 F.3d 585, 593 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A]ge-based claims have been
frequently made, but have been rejected in every circuit that has considered them."); Ford v.
Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 682 (6th Cir. 1988).
76. See Johnson, 92 F.3d at 590 (rejecting an FCS claim despite the fact that the juror
administrator admitted on the stand that "he excluded all persons under the age of 25" due
to his belief, based on personal experience, that "young persons were not mature enough
and did not have enough experience to be jurors").
77. See Donald H. Zeigler, Young Adults as a Cognizable Group inJury Selection, 76 MICH. L. REV.
1045, 1090 (1978) (collecting and presenting original empirical evidence suggesting a
connection between age group and jury deliberations).
78. See id.; cf. Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, but Is She a Soul Sister? Race-
Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 327, 354 (1994) ("[O]ne
shared and highly relevant aspect of the lives of many dark-skinned Americans is their
experience of discrimination in formal and informal law enforcement settings.").
79. Offering an alternative enfranchisement approach, Vikram Amar has argued that the voting
amendments should apply with equal force to jury voting and that the constitutional "age
requirements for federal elective office holding" offer constitutionally preferred age-defined
groups for FCS purposes. Amar, Jury Service, supra note 11, at 216. But see MICHAEL J.
KLARvAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 40 (2004) (arguing that the Reconstruction
Congress did not intend the Fifteenth Amendment to apply to juries).
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especially as ethnic categories proliferate in our increasingly diverse society.s
Yet courts have found assumptions of age-based similarity to be
"stereotypical," even as they hold that racial groups represent sui generis
"communities of interest. ''8, Courts' unanimous refusal to accept the
distinctiveness of age-based groups suggests that they are not exclusively
motivated by demographic conceptions of jury legitimacy. Rather, courts
applying the first Duren prong may be following intuitions best justified by an
enfranchisement conception.
Of course, many potential indicia of group membership -such as political
affiliation, place of residence, or income -lie somewhere between permanent
traits like gender and ephemeral characteristics like age. How are courts to
determine which, if any, of these categories merits FCS protection? Under the
demographic approach, courts must adjudicate these claims by entangling
themselves in the politics of difference. Do Catholics, the deaf, and residents of
the inner city each possess a distinctive outlook, or are their perspectives
sufficiently similar to those of other groups, like Muslims, the hearing, and
inhabitants of rural areas ?82 Are all members of admittedly distinctive groups,
like African-Americans, fungible for FCS purposes, or are some black
communities distinctive in ways that others are not?8' These are not questions
that courts can competently answer or that parties can competently argue. Far
from being amenable to objective proof, the distinctiveness inquiry raises
8o. See KENNEDY, supra note 41, at 244; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, DIvERSITY IN AMERICA 145
(2003) (noting that the 2000 census recognized 126 distinct group combinations and that
legal and other factors will "encourage many other eager groups (Arab-Americans, for
example) to demand their own specific listing in the census form"); Jennifer Lee & Frank D.
Bean, America's Changing Color Lines: Immigration, Race/Ethnicity, and Multiracial
Identification, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 221, 221 (2004) ("Currently, I in 40 persons identifies
himself or herself as multiracial, and this figure could soar to 1 in 5 by the year 2050.").
81. See Wells v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1133, 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) ("Any conclusion that college
students are somehow 'different' from other members of the community would have to rely
on stereotypical assumptions about them; i.e., that college students as a whole think
differently, on average, from other members of society as a whole and on average. We
decline to engage in such unsupported speculation."). Apparently, less "stereotypical"
assumptions underlie the Wells court's acceptance of women, African-Americans, and
Hispanics as distinctive groups. Cf. id.
82. See, e.g., State v. Spivey, 700 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Mo. 1985) (finding that the deaf do not
constitute a distinctive group under Duren because "[t]he misfortune of deafness ... exists
in all segments of the community" and because "[w]e doubt that deaf persons have a
community of attitudes or ideas"). But see CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, INSIDE DEAF
CULTURE (2005).
83. See Preston v. Mandeville, 479 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejecting an effort to remedy black
underrepresentation by adding eligible black jurors from only one locale to the exclusion of
all other black population groups within the jurisdiction).
1593
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
profound and inherently contestable issues of group identity.8' Further, any
court that does seriously take up this daunting enterprise risks engaging in
stereotypical and essentialist reasoning. Perhaps because of these problems, the
distinctiveness test has become more of a mantra than a source of judicial
reasoning.
An enfranchisement approach offers a more objective and judicially
manageable alternative. Instead of being concerned with the substantive
differences and similarities between and among identity groups, an
enfranchisement-based FCS doctrine would be concerned primarily with
whether a group's membership was sufficiently fixed and well defined for
underrepresentation of that group to serve as a meaningful proxy for individual
disenfranchisement. 8' In addition to race and gender, other plainly cognizable
groups might include people with brown eyes or those with Social Security
numbers ending with "2." Furthermore, groups defined by mutable or less
objective traits, like area of residence86 or income class,87 may supply evidence
84. The distinctiveness test can be contrasted with the comparatively objective Gingles factors,
examined in racial vote dilution claims, which focus on a given racial group's geographic
compactness, tendency to engage in racial bloc voting, and susceptibility to oppositional
racial bloc voting. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
85. This approach is consistent with the famous passage from Peters v. Kiff: "When any large and
identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from
the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of
which is unknown and perhaps unknowable." 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (plurality opinion)
(Marshall, J.) (emphasis added).
86. Overall residential mobility patterns suggest that residency is usually insufficiently fixed for
FCS purposes. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000
(INTERNET RELEASE) 3-1 (2002), http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/2ooo/
profile2000.pdf (indicating that approximately 16% of the U.S. population aged one and
older changed addresses between March 1999 and March 2000, and that mobility rates tend
to decline with age). Courts consistently reject FCS claims based on geographically defined
groups. See, e.g., United States v. Canfield, 879 F.2d 4 46, 447 (8th Cir. 1989).
87. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (finding an FCS violation resulting from the
intentional exclusion of day laborers); Mitchell S. Zuklie, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section
Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REV. 101, 122-24 (1996) (arguing and collecting data suggesting that
poverty constitutes a status permanent enough for FCS purposes). While the long-term or
chronically poor may constitute relatively fixed categories, on average about 40% of poor
Americans exit poverty each year. See Robert G. Valletta, The Ins and Outs of Poverty in
Advanced Economies: Poverty Dynamics in Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and the United
States 34 tbl.2, 35 tbl.3, 36 tbl. 4 (Fed. Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2004-18, 2004),
available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2oo 4 /wpo4-i8bk.pdf; see
also Ann Huff Stevens, Climbing out of Poverty, Falling Back in: Measuring the Persistence of
Poverty overMultiple Spells, 34 J. HUM. RESOURCES 557, 567 & tbl.1 (1999) (providing poverty
exit and reentry rates by duration of the initial poverty spell). Poverty alone is therefore not
a useful FCS metric.
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of disenfranchisement in some contexts. Lower courts have plausibly
concluded that Jews, the Amish, Puerto Ricans, homosexuals, and Native
Americans are distinctive groups with cognizable FCS claims."8 While these
cases did not emphasize the objectivity or fixity of group membership,
defendants could have adduced such evidence. Further, if FCS claimants
produced reliable evidence showing that these or other quasi-permanent
groups were usefully but still not perfectly fixed or objectively ascertainable,
courts could require an elevated showing of substantial underrepresentation.8"
For example, defendants might be able to demonstrate that, on average, 15% of
a given jurisdiction's population both enters and exits a particular income class
(or age group or residential area) per year, but that that subpopulation,
properly defined, is otherwise fixed and objective. In that case, a court might
require FCS claimants to show that the income group is underrepresented by
25%- that is, 15% in addition to the io% threshold usually imposed in race-
and gender-based claims. In this way, a permanence approach to Duren's first
prong could bring FCS doctrine to bear on forms of group exclusion that are
rendered inaccessible under current precedent.
In sum, an enfranchisement approach supports current doctrine regarding
the first Duren prong, but with important qualifications. Both the difficulty of
adducing reliable evidence regarding the fixity of quasi-permanent groups and
the ready availability of data bearing on ethnicity and gender support courts'
presumption that the latter groups constitute the heart of FCS claims.
Nonetheless, courts should be mindful that other permanent or even quasi-
permanent traits may sometimes provide reliable evidence of juror
disenfranchisement.
B. Substantial Underrepresentation: Measurement and Inference
The substantial underrepresentation requirement has elicited more
scholarly and judicial commentary than either of the other Duren prongs.
Because the Supreme Court has not prescribed a specific metric for group
representation, lower courts have had the freedom and the burden of deciding
88. See United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d ii5, 1161 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding Jews to be a distinctive
group); People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 341 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding homosexuals to
be distinctive under California's constitution); State v. Villafane, 325 A.2d 251, 256 (Conn.
1973) (Puerto Ricans); State v. Fulton, 566 N.E.2d 1195, 1201 (Ohio 1991) (Amish); State v.
Plenty Horse, 184 N.W.2d 654, 656 (S.D. 1971) (Native Americans).
89. Cf infra Section III.B (discussing United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 124o (2d Cir. 1995),
which required a lesser showing of substantial underrepresentation in light of egregious
evidence of systematic exclusion).
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the matter for themselves.9" Though several tests have been proposed and even
employed by courts, the two most commonly employed methods are,
unsurprisingly, also the two simplest. The first method, known as the
"absolute disparity test" (ADT), subtracts the distinctive group's absolute
percentile representation in venires91 from its absolute percentile representation
in the overall population. By contrast, the second approach, called the
"comparative disparity test" (CDT), divides this absolute disparity figure by
the underrepresented group's share of the overall population. Substantial
underrepresentation is found when the output of either test exceeds a certain
fraction.
While ADT indicates the portion of the overall population that has been
excluded, CDT measures "the decreased likelihood that members of an
underrepresented group will be called for jury service." 92 In practical terms, the
main difference between the two tests is that FCS claims based on small
population groups are disadvantaged under ADT and advantaged under CDT.
For example, under the io% threshold commonly applied under ADT, a
population group comprising 8% of the overall population could not serve as
the basis of an FCS claim, even if that group were entirely unrepresented. By
contrast, a group that made up 8% of the overall population but only 4% of
venires would yield an impressive CDT output of 50%. CDT thus captures the
common intuition that underrepresentation is more objectionable when a large
fraction of a given group is excluded.
CDT would plainly be preferable if, as some commentators have suggested,
courts thought of distinctive groups not as a set of individual impartial jurors,
but rather as interest groups insisting on full representation, somewhat like
political parties in a parliamentary legislature. 93 Naturally, any such group
go. In Duren, the Court did not endorse any particular test or establish the relevant threshold at
which substantial underrepresentation takes place. See 439 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1979). The
common lo% "absolute disparity test" threshold is adapted from the equal protection case
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See, e.g., United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183,
190 (5th Cir. 1980).
gi. Instead of collecting data on a long series of venires, courts often examine the group's
representation in "qualified juror wheels" - that is, the list of eligible and responsive
potential jurors who make up venires over a period of time. See, e.g., United States v. Gault,
141 F.3d 1399, 1402 (ioth Cir. 1998).
92. United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1272 (ioth Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted).
93. See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 25, at 388-91 (suggesting that juries should represent
distinct "communities of interest" defined in racial and geographic terms); Gerken, supra
note 23, at 1139 (describing jury selection alternatives as a "choice" faced by minority
groups). Such comparisons would have more force if there were a jury dilution statute
parallel to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
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would have grounds to complain if it were denied a proportionate number of
seats, even if those seats only made up only a small percentage of the overall
membership. However, a defendant would not share this complaint. Because it
is unlikely that even a single member of a small group would ultimately be
empanelled in any given jury of twelve, a small group's total exclusion would
not appreciably impact the defendant's "fair possibility" of a representative jury
or warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.9 4 CDT is therefore
unsupported even by the demography-based approach embodied in current
precedent. 9
ADT is in fact the leading test; no jurisdiction has accepted CDT as the
general test for substantial underrepresentation 6 Even when courts consider
CDT, they usually do so in conjunction with ADT or some other side-
constraint to ensure that successful FCS claims are not based on the exclusion
of very small portions of the overall population. 97 This trend is readily
explainable under an enfranchisement approach. FCS doctrine ensures that no
significant portion of the total jury franchise is excluded over time. This
objective renders CDT's assessment of group underrepresentation useful only
insofar as it illuminates overall jurisdictional patterns -a function that small
distinctive groups are inherently less able to fulfill. Relying on ADT thus
allows courts to resist FCS claims predicated on unhelpfully small groups (that
is, groups defined by relatively uncommon traits) and encourages defendants
to seek out evidence that sheds more light on how the jury selection system
affects the jury franchise as a whole.
In the exceptional cases that rely on CDT and other statistical methods,
courts have noted the purported unfairness of ignoring FCS claims based on
94. Recognizing this problem, one commentator fashioned a "disparity of risk" test that
"precisely reflects the change in the defendant's ex ante chances of drawing a representative
jury." Peter A. Detre, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in the Composition of the
Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L.J. 1913, 1915 (1994). No court has adopted this relatively complex
test.
95. Courts sometimes express this point by invoking "the substantial impact test," which
multiplies the ADT output by the number of jurors in a given venire, grand jury, or petit
jury. By expressing the ADT output in more practical terms, the substantial impact test
deflates FCS claims based on diminutive population groups. See, e.g., State v. Gibbs, 758
A.2d 327, 337-38 (Conn. 2000).
96. For especially thorough discussions favoring the use of ADT, see United States v. Weaver,
267 F. 3 d 231, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2ool); United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 6-8 (1st Cir. 1999); and
Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9 th Cir. 1998).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1403 (ioth Cir. 1998).
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small groups. 9' However, these holdings are better justified by the fact that the
groups in question have been affected by particularly faulty jury selection
procedures under the systematic exclusion prong. In perhaps the most
extraordinary such cases, United States v. Osorio99 and United States v.
Jackman, ' a computer glitch prevented jury summonses from being sent to
eligible jurors living in Hartford and New Britain. Evidence adduced at trial
showed that the affected areas were disproportionately inhabited by African-
Americans and Hispanics, but minority underrepresentation on jury venires
was minimal-and far below the lo% ADT threshold that the Second Circuit
normally requires.01 Yet the courts applied CDT to find substantial
underrepresentation. Arguing that the nature of the exclusion was not a
"benign" governmental failure, the courts effectively loosened Duren's
substantial underrepresentation requirement in the face of a particularly
outrageous case of systematic exclusion.0 2
Although this outcome is puzzling under a demographic conception of jury
legitimacy, it is readily understandable under an enfranchisement approach.
Connecticut venires may have remained racially representative despite the
computer glitch, but an identifiable number of eligible citizens had been
deprived of the opportunity to participate in juries for well over a year. This
outcome was especially objectionable both because the affected regions were
almost absolutely excluded (underrepresentation approaching ioo%) and
because the government's negligently designed and implemented selection
98. See, e.g., Azania v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1253, 1258-59 (Ind. 2002) (using CDT to find a statutory
violation when a jury selection program effectively excluded two cities); People v. Hubbard,
552 N.W.2d 493, 503-04 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (lowering the substantial
underrepresentation threshold because a jury selection error effectively excluded the city of
Kalamazoo and so was not "benign").
99. 8oi F. Supp. 966 (D. Conn. 1992).
loo. 46 F.3d 124o (2d Cir. 1995).
l1. See id. at 1248 (Walker, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment should not be invoked to
correct jury selection errors that have only a de minimis effect on a criminal defendant's right
to a representative jury venire .... ).
1o2. See id. at 1247 (majority opinion) ("The facts in this case reveal circumstances far less benign
than... even those in Osorio, where the apparently inadvertent exclusion of Hartford and
New Britain residents had not previously been discovered."); Osorio, 8ol F. Supp. at 979
("[T]he exclusion of Hartford and New Britain from the Qualified Wheel, an occurrence
not the result of random chance, is not 'benign'...."); see also People v. Smith, 61S N.W.2d
1, 11 (Mich. 2000) (Cavanagh, J., concurring) ("If a jury selection process appears ex ante
likely to systematically exclude a distinctive group, that is, the system contains 'non-benign'
factors, a court may essentially give a defendant the benefit of the doubt on
underrepresentation, even if the system ex post proves to work no systematic exclusion.").
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process was directly responsible (systematic exclusion)."' 3  On this
understanding, there was no need for evidence showing that the affected
regions were of any particular demographic composition. The plaintiffs claim
would not be that African-Americans or Hispanics were underrepresented in
venires -they were not-but rather that the inhabitants of the affected regions
had been disenfranchised due to an egregious governmental blunder.
This leaves the question of how to define the appropriate population
baseline for showing substantial underrepresentation: by the total population,
or only those eligible for jury service? 10 4 To be sure, juror qualifications can be
viewed as either justifiable or unnecessary limitations on individual rights
under both demographic and enfranchisement approaches. Yet the eligible
juror baseline is in tension with jury demography because using eligible jurors
as the baseline necessarily overlooks-and thereby blesses -juror
qualifications' tendency to disproportionately exclude distinctive groups.'Os
Under an enfranchisement approach, by contrast, an eligible juror baseline
should be preferred. The total population may usually be a convenient proxy
for the jury-eligible population, but these two categories are not the same and
in some contexts may be quite different. And, indeed, courts have acted on this
possibility. At least when the relevant data is readily available,1°6 many courts
prefer to measure substantial underrepresentation by comparing the distinctive
group's representation in venires with its representation among eligible jurors -
that is, among members of the jury franchise.1 7
103. See Osorio, 8oi F. Supp. at 978 (highlighting "the total exclusion from the Qualified Wheel
of the two largest cities in the Division").
104. Permissible qualifications for jury service largely overlap with those for voting and include
citizenship, age, residency, and lack of prior felony conviction; however, reflecting again the
unique logistical necessities of jury service as opposed to electoral voting, jury qualifications
include English language competence. See, e.g., JSSA, 28 U.S.C. § 186 5 (b)(2)-(3) (2000);
STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, supra note 50, at 218-21; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, at 263-72 tbls.39 &
40 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98o6.pdf (providing
disability disqualifications by state). Courts have upheld such qualifications despite their
exclusionary effects on distinctive groups. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F. 3d
319, 326 (1st Cir. 1995).
105. See, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 65, 67
(2003) (noting "glaring racial disparities" resulting from felon exclusion rules).
1o6. See People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 442 (Cal. 1984) (declining to require an eligible juror
baseline when the required data is "almost impossible to obtain" (quoting David Kairys et
al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CAL. L. REV. 776, 785-86
n.63 (1977))).
107. See United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 447 F.3d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2006) (using the
jurisdiction's "percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics" as the FCS baseline); United States v.
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C. Systematic Exclusion: Voting and Voluntarism
The history of FCS doctrine's little-understood third prong, the
requirement of "systematic" exclusion, is rich and provocative. The seminal
Ballard opinion used the term "systematic" as part of a larger phrase, referring
to the "systematic and intentional exclusion of women. '" °8 This close
association between systematicity and intentionality continued as late as the
careful discussion of unconstitutional jury discrimination in Washington v.
Davis.'°9 But by the time FCS matured into its own doctrine in Duren,
"systematic exclusion" had become a freestanding constitutional criterion.
Indeed, Duren specifically held that FCS claims only required "the cause of the
underrepresentation [to be] systematic- that is, inherent in the particular jury-
selection process utilized..... This deliberate shift away from intentionality
constitutes the main practical distinction between FCS and equal protection
jurisprudence. "' Taylor v. Louisiana.2 and Duren explained that FCS doctrine's
lack of an intentionality requirement reflected the Court's desire to stamp out
demographic underrepresentation, whatever the cause. Consistent with this
goal, Taylor overruled a policy requiring women to opt in to jury service," 3
while Duren found an FCS violation based on a policy that granted women the
ability to opt out of jury service simply by not appearing in court.1 4 These
Williams, 264 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 2001); People v. Anderson, 22 P. 3d 347, 361 (Cal. 2001); see
also United States v. Rioux, 9 7 F.3d 648, 657 (2d Cir. 1996) (emulating voting rights cases in
holding "that the appropriate measure in this case is the eighteen and older subset of the
population, regardless of other qualifications for jury service").
io8. 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (prohibiting
systematic exclusion under equal protection jurisprudence).
lo9. 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) ("It is also clear from the cases dealing with racial discrimination in
the selection of juries that the systematic exclusion of Negroes is itself such an 'unequal
application of the law... as to show intentional discrimination."' (quoting Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398, 404 (1945))).
110. 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979).
mii. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (establishing a three-part test for prima
facie equal protection violations, including (i) identification of a "distinct class ... singled
out for different treatment under the laws, as written or applied," (2) "underrepresentation"
of that group "over a significant period of time," and (3) "a selection procedure that is
susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral"). One important difference between Duren
and Castaneda is that the latter requires at least an inference of discriminatory intent.
112. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
113. Id. at 534.
114. 439 U.S. at 370.
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foundational cases thus suggested that an FCS claim need not demonstrate that
eligible jurors had been excluded or impeded from participation."'
Yet the systemic exclusion requirement has come to be understood as a
process-based test of how the underrepresentation came about," 6 such that the
sine qua non of any FCS violation is a showing of an improperly exclusionary
government practice.1 7 Weather and natural disasters," 8 demographic changes
in local communities," 9 and voluntary decisions by eligible jurors"2° do not
entail government exclusion and thus do not give rise to FCS violations, even if
unquestionably distinctive groups are substantially underrepresented. By
contrast, a jurisdiction's failure to send out jury questionnaires or summonses
is paradigmatic systematic exclusion, as indicated by Osorio, Jackman, and other
cases involving faulty jury selection programs. Given this doctrinal emphasis
on exclusion, Taylor and Duren seem in retrospect to have depended on
115. See Leipold, supra note 31, at 971 ("[T]he government's obligation to do more than remove
barriers seemed to be the message of Duren v. Missouri.").
116. On a demographic approach, it is unclear why the process by which a jury is selected would
ever be constitutionally important. See Underwood, supra note 41, at 730 ("[I]f an all-white
jury selected through a discriminatory process is a biased decisionmaker, then the identical
all-white jury selected through a nondiscriminatory process must likewise be a biased
decisionmaker.").
117. See Leipold, supra note 31, at 970 ("Courts now seem to view their duty as little more than
removing barriers to jury service: voting lists are an acceptable source of jurors, regardless of
any underrepresentation that results, as long as there are no barriers to voter registration.");
see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 ("Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular
composition, but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are
drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to
be reasonably representative thereof." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
118. See United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411, 414-15 (8th Cir. 1978) (rejecting an FCS claim
based on the exclusion of rural jurors due to bad weather); United States v. Jones, No. 2:05-
cr-o0231-LMA-ALC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 411o, at "iO-ll (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 20o6) (finding
no possibility of an FCS violation in the wake of Hurricane Katrina because any
underrepresentation would be due to "external" factors); State v. McDonald, 387 So. 2d
1116, 1123 (La. 198o) (finding no FCS violation when flooding prevented eligible rural jurors
from arriving for jury service).
9ig. See United States v. Rioux, 97 F. 3d 648, 658 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The inability to serve juror
questionnaires because they were returned as undeliverable is not due to the system itself,
but to outside forces, such as demographic changes.").
120. See, e.g., United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding that
the JSSA does not require jury administrators to follow up with jury non-responses);
Zuklie, supra note 87, at 146 ("[T]he doctrine prohibits systematic underrepresentation
rather than voluntary self-exclusion ...."). Gometz also discussed the enfranchisement goals
of the JSSA. See 730 F.2d at 480 ("Congress wanted to make it possible for all qualified
persons to serve on juries, which is different from forcing all qualified persons to be
available for jury service.").
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Missouri's facially unequal treatment of men and women in violation of equal
protection principles, and not on the importance of including special
viewpoints. 12 ' The Court itself has tacitly endorsed this revisionist
interpretation by incorporating Taylor and Duren into its equal protection
jurisprudence, and even by discussing them as though they were equal
protection cases."'
The importance of juror exclusion is also manifest in the continuing
practice of permitting jury exemptions even after Taylor and Duren. Current
jury practice renders jury service voluntary through hardship, occupational,
and other exemptions. 12  While the legislative trend among states has been
toward eliminating jury service exemptions, they are certainly constitutional. 14
Even when courts entertain the possibility that traditional jury exemptions
might satisfy the Duren prongs, those prima facie FCS claims are easily
defeated on the ground that the exemptions serve "compelling state interests."
In the FCS context, this is a low bar indeed. Exemptions from jury service are
available not just for law enforcement officers, family caretakers, and the
infirm, but also for doctors, lawyers, dentists, and students."' Consequently,
these groups can avoid jury duty even if their decisions often undermine
defendants' purported right to a demographically representative jury. ' 6 Under
an enfranchisement approach, jury exemptions would be more defensible,
121. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371 n.* (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
majority is in truth concerned with the equal protection rights of women to participate in
the judicial process .... ").
122. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) ("Taylor relied on Sixth
Amendment principles, but the opinion's approach is consistent with the heightened equal
protection scrutiny afforded gender-based classifications."); see also id. at 152 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing both Taylor and Duren - and only those cases - for the proposition that
"[t] here is no doubt under our precedents... that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits sex
discrimination in the selection ofjurors").
123. Courts have interpreted the JSSA to permit such exemptions as long as they are founded on
"objective criteria," so as to preclude the possibility of covert discrimination. E.g., United
States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 33 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Bearden, 659
F.2d 590, 607 (sth Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981).
124. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) ("The States are free to grant exemptions
from jury service to individuals in case of special hardship or incapacity and to those
engaged in particular occupations the uninterrupted performance of which is critical to the
community's welfare." (citing Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (19o6))).
125. See STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, supra note so, at 223-26.
126. See Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury and
Jury Selection System, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 238, 263-66 (1994) (noting that hardship and
occupational exemptions sometimes result in underrepresentation of the elderly, the poor,
the less educated, daily wage earners, residents of rural areas, and minorities, particularly
black and Hispanic women).
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reflecting a (contestable) governmental judgment that the administrative
benefits of mandatory service can be outweighed by personal and social costs.
We have already seen that egregious instances of systematic exclusion can
justify adopting a more permissive test for substantial underrepresentation. 17
Yet enfranchisement is a double-edged sword, and courts more often invoke
the enfranchisement-based systematic exclusion requirement to reject than to
sustain FCS challenges. Indeed, the connection between enfranchisement and
Duren's systematic exclusion prong is perhaps most visible in courts' refusal to
sustain FCS claims based on the use of voter registration records to populate
lists of eligible jurors."' These records plainly underrepresent cognizable
groups, including African-Americans. 2 9 Nonetheless, the Jury Selection and
Service Act (JSSA) of 1968 requires federal jury administrators to populate
their eligible jury lists with (at least) those names present on voter registration
rolls, thereby establishing a default practice emulated by most states."' This
reformist measure was designed to ensure not only that jurors were chosen
from a wide sample of the population, but also that the same
antidiscrimination protections that benefited black voters would also benefit
black jurors. Because the JSSA and FCS doctrine became law at roughly the
same historical moment, courts routinely assume that the procedures
127. See supra Section III.B (discussing Osorio and Jackman).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Ireland, 62 F.3d 227, 231 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he mere fact that one
identifiable group of individuals votes in a lower proportion than the rest of the population
does not make a jury selection system illegal or unconstitutional." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Young, 822 F.2d 1234, 1239 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The use of voter
registration lists as the sole source of the names of potential jurors is not constitutionally
invalid, absent a showing of discrimination in the compiling of such voter registration lists."
(quoting United States v. Gordon, 493 F. Supp. 814, 820-21 (N.D.N.Y. 198o), affd, 655 F.2d
478 (2d Cir. 1981))).
129. See Fukurai & Butler, supra note 126, at 245-47 (amassing statistical evidence showing that
traditional source lists, including registered voter lists, disproportionately exclude African-
Americans and Hispanics). Alternate source lists present their own exclusionary problems.
See Ted C. Newman, Fair Cross-Sections and Good Intentions: Representation in Federal Juries,
18 JUST. SYS. J. 211 (1996) (arguing that supplementing lists of registered voters with lists of
drivers in the Northern District of Illinois would exacerbate the underrepresentation of
African-Americans).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2000); see also STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, supra note 5o. Fewer
than one-third of the states still employ "key man"-like selection systems that empower jury
administrators to qualify potential jurors on an ad hoc basis, pursuant to statutory criteria.
See JONAKAIT, supra note 26, at 121-22; see also supra note 59. Because juror qualifications are
compatible with enfranchisement principles, see supra note 104, these systems, while
exclusionary, are not inherently disenfranchising, see Singleton v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1395,
1398 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that nonrandom jury selection systems are "disfavored" under
FCS analysis, while upholding such a system).
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established in the JSSA are per se compliant with FCS doctrine. Yet the JSSA
did not provide that voter registration lists are always sufficient to ensure fair
cross-sectionality. On the contrary, it specified that supplemental lists might be
required to ensure fair cross-sectionality. 3 ' Courts' hostility to FCS claims
based on underinclusive voter registration lists therefore cannot be explained
by reference to the JSSA alone.
When pressed, courts defend voter registration lists' exclusionary
consequences by arguing that they are not "exclusionary" at all, but rather are
traceable to individual choices.' 32 Consistent with this view, the searching
opinion in United States v. Cecil '33 favorably cited legislative history indicating
that any exclusion resulting from the JSSA's focus on voter registration lists
would not be unfair because no economic or social characteristic would prevent
a person from placing his name on the voter registration list.3 4 Thus, courts
expounding FCS doctrine generally follow the JSSA in effectively holding that
as long as the electoral franchise is fairly accessible, the same is true of the jury
franchise. 3 '
Even accepting Cecil's voluntariness paradigm, however, the "decision" not
to participate in the jury franchise might not constitute a choice in any
normatively meaningful sense. It could, for example, be an inadvertent
consequence of the need to focus on more urgent priorities, such as having to
make ends meet. If this enfranchisement-based critique is accepted, then the
government may be obliged to facilitate the inclusion of unregistered but
eligible participants in the electoral and jury franchises. Congress recognized
such a duty in the electoral context in the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 (the "motor voter" law).,3 6 'While this measure has the indirect effect of
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 186 3 (b)(2). As of 1997, "seventeen districts in nine circuits (used] multiple
source lists when selecting potential jurors." Bueker, supra note 32, at 391 (arguing that
supplementation is costly and relatively ineffective).
132. At least some legislators supported the JSSA on the ground that voter registration lists
would have salutary exclusionary consequences, as unregistered voters were presumed to
lack the civic virtues appropriate for jury service. See ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 129.
133. 836 F.2d 1431, 1445-49 (4 th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
134. See H.R. REP. No. 90-1076, at 6 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1795; see also
United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 482 (7 th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("Some voluntarism is
.. implicit in the use of voter lists, since there is no legal duty in this country to vote .... ").
135. See Cecil, 836 F.2d at 1448 ("[P]ractically every Circuit... as well as the legislative intent
expressed in the Jury Selection Act itself, . . . categorically establish[ed] that there is no
violation of the jury cross-section requirement where there is merely underrepresentation of
a cognizable class by reason of failure to register, when that right is fully open.").
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(a)(2) (2000) (recognizing that "it is the duty of the Federal, State, and
local governments to promote the exercise" of the right to vote).
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promoting jury enfranchisement, additional reforms could be instituted
specifically within the jury selection process. Examples of enfranchisement-
promoting jury reforms include increasing jurors' hourly compensation,
reducing peremptory strikes, supplementing and updating eligible juror lists,
and initiating public programs that encourage or facilitate voter registration
and jury participation. In contrast to jury affirmative action programs, which
manage citizens on the basis of essentialist assumptions, these and other
enfranchisement-promoting reforms empower individuals by inviting them to
participate in democratic self-government. 13 7
IV. EXPLORING THE DOCTRINE'S FRONTIERS: UNITED STATES V.
GREEN
United States v. Green , 8 is perhaps the most important recent FCS case.
Confronted with problems of juror exclusion and minority underrepresentation
common throughout the United States,139 Judge Nancy Gertner fashioned both
a new test for FCS violations and a novel remedy for minority
underrepresentation. Neither of these experiments was successful, as Green's
adapted FCS standard could not be satisfied in practice, and its remedial order
was vacated by writ of mandamus.1 40 Yet in March 2007, by a vote of the
district's judges, the revised jury selection plan that Gertner envisioned came
into effect in the District of Massachusetts.' 41 Green is therefore poised to
137. See Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641 (1996); Avern Cohn
& David R. Sherwood, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action in jury Selection, 32 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 323 (1999) (discussing the Eastern District of Michigan's switch from jury
affirmative action to an enfranchisement-promoting jury registration campaign); Kurt M.
Saunders, Race and Representation injury Service Selection, 36 DuQ. L. REV. 49 (1997).
138. 389 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. Mass. 2005).
139. See generally Robert G. Boatright, Why Citizens Don't Respond to Jury Summonses, and What
Courts Can Do About It, 82 JUDICATURE 156, 157 (1999) (summarizing data indicating that
12% of state jury summonses and 8% of federal summonses are returned as undeliverable);
Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury de Medietate
Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 8oo (1994).
140. See In re United States, 426 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (abrogating Green on the grounds that
individual district judges do not have the authority to determine district jury selection
procedures).
141. See U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., Plan for Random Selection of Jurors,
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/New/RevisedJuryPlan.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2007); see
also Revisions to the Jury Plan of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts: Notes of the Jury Plan Committee, http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/New/
NotesofJuryPlanCommittee.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
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become a key point of comparison for future efforts at jury reform. 142 Yet Green
is an unstable compromise between demographic and enfranchisement
conceptions of jury legitimacy that is best resolved in the latter's favor. Green
thus shows how an enfranchisement approach can illuminate issues at the
forefront of FCS litigation. Section A argues that Gertner's frustration with
traditional tests of substantial underrepresentation is best explained and
justified on enfranchisement grounds. Section B argues that Green's novel
remedy for group underrepresentation is most defensible when reconceptualized
as an effort to rectify what I term "partial disenfranchisement."
A. Finding Jury Disenfranchisement
Green involved an FCS challenge to the District of Massachusetts's jury
selection system. The defendant's main allegation was that varying standards
in jury administration across counties resulted in a crazy quilt of inaccurate and
outdated eligible juror lists, thereby skewing black representation in venires.
For example, Dorchester, where African-Americans constituted 83% of the
population, was underrepresented by 22% on the district's list of eligible
jurors.'43 In Suffolk County, which contained many of the district's African-
American residents, 15% of jury summonses were returned as undeliverable,
possibly because their intended recipients had changed addresses. 144 Allegedly
because of these and other juror selection failures, only 3% of those included in
the district's federal venires were African-American, although African-
Americans made up about 7% of the relevant jury pool.145
Because African-Americans are plainly a distinctive group for FCS
purposes, the first step in assessing the plaintiffs' FCS claim was to determine
whether they had shown substantial underrepresentation as required by the
second Duren prong. Addressing this issue, Judge Gertner criticized the First
Circuit's reliance on ADT as a means of finding substantial
underrepresentation. Though the First Circuit had not set a definitive
142. The Hennepin County, Minnesota, proposal for race-based targeted mailings is a focal point
in academic literature, even though Minnesota courts specifically refused to implement it on
the ground that it would violate equal protection doctrine. See Hennepin County v. Perry,
561 N.W.2d 889, 896-97 (Minn. 1997). Likewise, the much-discussed system implemented
in the Eastern District of Michigan was struck down on equal protection grounds in United
States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3 d 1092 (6th Cir. 1998); see supra note 33. By contrast, the remedy
propounded in Green is now employed in the District of Massachusetts and, because it is
race-blind, is almost certainly constitutional.
143. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 59.
144. Id. at 61.
145. Id. at 37.
16o6
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
116:1568 2007
RE-JUSTIFYING TH.E FAIR CROSS SECTION REQUIREMENT
threshold for underrepresentation, Gertner noted that it had favorably cited
precedent embracing the 10% threshold while deeming figures of around 3% to
be unsubstantial.' 46 This posed a problem for the plaintiffs in Green, as a io%
absolute disparity threshold would mean that African-Americans could not be
substantially underrepresented in the Eastern Division of the District of
Massachusetts, the population of which was only 7% black.' 47
Gertner believed that FCS claims should not be foreclosed in this way. But
instead of drawing on demography-based reasons to argue in favor of a
different substantial underrepresentation metric such as CDT, Gertner instead
focused on the district's alleged systematic exclusion. Specifically, Gertner
proposed a "hybrid approach" under which evidence of official misfeasance
would lower the substantial underrepresentation bar.14 8 But why should this
be? If FCS doctrine is truly about preventing the exclusion of distinctive
viewpoints, then the manner in which the state excludes particular viewpoints
should be irrelevant to the exclusion's unconstitutionality. The expanded role
that Gertner envisioned for the systematic exclusion prong seems to consider
governmental misconduct in the jury selection system as a freestanding
constitutional concern. In this respect, Green followed Osorio and Jackman in
relying on enfranchisement-based intuitions to justify an explicitly
demography-based application of FCS doctrine.
Unfortunately, Green was ultimately debilitated by its attempt to appeal to
both enfranchisement and demographic intuitions. According to Jeffrey
Abramson, the court-appointed jury expert, the hybrid approach required the
plaintiffs to demonstrate that the government's misfeasance brought about
underrepresentation of at least 3%.149 Thus, in addition to requiring a showing
of governmental responsibility under the systematic exclusion prong, the
hybrid approach required measurement of the identified exclusionary
mechanisms' racial impact. This rule placed a burden on aggrieved parties far
beyond that imposed by normal application of the Duren prongs. In Green, all
the tools of social science were insufficient to disaggregate the many factors
that bore on black underrepresentation in the district.5 The plaintiffs' burden
146. See id. at So-5i; see also United States v. Royal, 174 F.3 d 1 (ist Cir. 1999); United States v.
Pion, 25 F.3d 18 (lst Cir. 1994); United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21 (lst Cir. 1984).
147. See Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
148. Id. at 51 ("If defendants can identify a mechanism by which a cognizable class is excluded...
and if they can show that such misfeasance contributes to African-American
underrepresentation in the jury pool, such a showing should suffice even if the absolute
disparity is 'only' 2 or 3%.").
149. Id.
1so. See id. at 62.
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was thus rendered practically insurmountable, and Green found no FCS
violation, despite abundant evidence of "clear procedural defects" that
"disproportionately affect a cognizable group." ''
Gertner accepted this conclusion grudgingly, noting that such evidence
should be enough to satisfy the hybrid approach: "[I]f the goal [of FCS
doctrine] is a fully representative jury, it should be enough that official
misfeasance played a part in diminishing African-American representation,
even if we cannot quantify that role . . . .'"" This statement underscores the
dual-loyalties problem entailed in any hybrid approach to FCS doctrine. On
the one hand, Gertner insisted that the goal of FCS doctrine is demographic
proportionality. Therefore, she was bound to require some showing of actual
underrepresentation. On the other hand, Gertner also believed that a finding of
governmental culpability could compensate for a weak showing of group
underrepresentation. Gertner's approach was especially remarkable in that she
would have found governmental misfeasance whenever state policies skewed
the racial composition of jury venires to any extent. But this criterion for
government wrongdoing is too uncompromising given the prior assumption
that FCS doctrine is meant to promote demographic representativeness. In
Green, for example, government policies at most resulted in absolute black
underrepresentation of about 3%, and the plaintiffs could not establish what
portion of that already slight figure was attributable to the government
conduct in question. As Section III.B argued, such a small deviation from the
cross-sectionality ideal would only minimally impact the defendant's "fair
possibility" of a representative jury.
Green would have proceeded quite differently had it embraced a
thoroughgoing commitment to enfranchisement values. True, under an
enfranchisement approach, courts would still have to ask whether government
policies in fact excluded substantial numbers of eligible participants from the
jury franchise. But this question would take a different form. In Green, the
record indicated that many of the district's municipalities maintained eligible
juror lists that either overstated or understated the number of jury-eligible
individuals in given locales." 3 According to Abramson, however, the
"defendants' data [fell] short of proving that African-American residents
[were] being undercounted more than the other residents" of the district.5 4 In
other words, the defendants were able to show significant and systematic jury
151. Id. at 63.
152. Id. at 56-57.
153. Id. at 59-61.
154. Id. at 6o (emphasis added).
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exclusion but were unable to show that the resulting burdens fell
disproportionately on African-Americans. Under an enfranchisement
approach, this additional conclusion would be unnecessary to establish a prima
facie FCS violation.
Instead, an enfranchisement approach would require the defendants to
show that a significant number of identifiable eligible jurors were chronically
excluded from the jury franchise on account of governmental policy. Assuming
that "significant" disenfranchisement should be found under conditions
analogous to those under which courts currently find "substantial"
underrepresentation-that is, when at least io% of eligible jurors in a given
jurisdiction are disenfranchised -it may seem that the plaintiffs in Green could
easily have demonstrated unconstitutional disenfranchisement. Some counties,
like Dorchester, were underrepresented on the district's master jury wheel by
as much as 22%;s' over 12% of all jury summonses in the district were returned
as undeliverable, including over 15% of all summonses directed toward
residents of Boston;"s6 and over 12% of deliverable summonses received no
response.s7 Because all of these exclusionary forces operated in tandem, the
total number of people excluded by the district's jury selection system at any
one time was surely well over io% of the total population.
Troubling though these figures may be, however, they do not necessarily
support a finding of disenfranchisement. The group adversely affected by the
district's jury selection procedures is not defined by a permanent or even quasi-
permanent characteristic. Consequently, even if large numbers of eligible jurors
are left off juror lists and summonses are sent to undeliverable (e.g., out-of-
date) addresses, a policy of regularly updating jury records might over time
afford all eligible jurors a roughly equal chance of being called to service.
Further, the high numbers of unreturned summonses might be due to
nonexclusionary forces, including willful noncompliance. This is not to say
that the plaintiffs' case was implausible. On the contrary, the plaintiffs might
have been able to show, for example, that people of high residential mobility
(like renters) or inhabitants of particular regions constituted quasi-permanent
groups that were repeatedly excluded despite the repopulation of eligible juror
lists.
Besides determining the number of people who have been excluded from
jury service, an assessment of juror disenfranchisement might require asking
1s. Id. at 59.
1s6. Report on Defendant's Challenge to the Racial Composition of Jury Pools in the Eastern
Division of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts at 39, Green,
389 F. Supp. 2d 29 (No. 02-10301) [hereinafter Abramson Report].
IS7. Id. at 42.
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whether the government is taking appropriate steps to include eligible citizens.
Unlike the District of Connecticut in Osorio or Jackman, the District of
Massachusetts in Green appeared to comply with all relevant statutory
mandates. Additionally, some causes of underrepresentation, like residential
mobility, are inescapable features of jury administration. Indeed, the JSSA
arguably addressed this problem when it required that master jury wheels be
updated at least every four years. This rule may reflect a legislative judgment,
affirmed by courts, that regular four-year refilling strikes a constitutionally fair
balance between administrative costs and individual enfranchisement. .' 8 Of
course, there are presumably some circumstances in which a jury selection
system's records would be so out of date or otherwise erroneous as to frustrate
individuals' constitutionally entitled expectation of jury service. 9 For example,
if the record in Green had indicated that a cognizable group tended to be
excluded every time the master jury wheel was refilled or that residential
mobility was much higher in parts of the district than in the country generally,
then normal updates might have failed to ensure fair cross-sectionality.
Unfortunately, these issues go unexplored in a jurisprudence devoted to jury
demography, not enfranchisement.
B. Remedying Partial Disenfranchisement
Unable to demonstrate that the government was responsible for a sufficient
portion of the underrepresentation at issue, Gertner found no FCS violation
under her hybrid approach. She did, however, find a violation of the JSSA,
which she construed as imposing an affirmative duty on courts to maximize the
racial representativeness of venires through source list supplementation."'
158. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 138 (1974) ("[S]ome play in the joints of the jury-
selection process is necessary in order to accommodate the practical problems of judicial
administration. Congress could reasonably adopt procedures which, while designed to
assure that 'an impartial jury [is] drawn from a cross-section of the community,' at the same
time take into account practical problems in judicial administration. . . Congress may
necessarily conclude that some periodic delay in updating the wheel is reasonable to permit
the orderly administration of justice." (citation omitted) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 220 (1946))); United States v. Rodriguez, 588 F.2d 1003, 1OO8-O9 (5 th Cir. 1979);
People v. Bartlett, 393 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (1977). But see Amar, Jury Service, supra note ii, at
256 (maintaining that "[t]he infrequent (every four years) refilling of jury wheels ought to
be equally suspect" as "hold[ing] brief voting registration periods only once every four years
in the name of administrative convenience").
isg. See United States v. Dixon, No. Crim.A. 05-209, 2oo6 WL 278258, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 3,
20o6) ("[A] sufficiently outdated master wheel would violate the constitutional fair cross-
section requirement because it no longer represents the current community.").
16o. See Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 186 3 (b)(2) (2000)).
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This remedy was overturned on mandamus but has since become the policy of
the District of Massachusetts. Gertner's proposal was essentially that for every
undeliverable jury summons, an additional summons should be sent to the
same zip code containing the original undeliverable address. Meanwhile, the
undeliverable addresses would be purged from the district's list of eligible
jurors. This policy of "second-round mailings" would increase representation
from within zip codes that contained disproportionately high numbers of
undeliverable addresses as compared to the overall district. To the extent that
those zip codes contained disproportionately black residents, the second
mailing would also tend to increase the district's overall percentage of
summoned black jurors. This approach would have the crucial benefit of being
formally race-neutral-and therefore compliant with equal protection
jurisprudence-because second mailings would also be sent in response to
undeliverable addresses in predominantly white zip codes. 6 ' Further, the
implementation of second mailings would not substantially alter the random
jury selection procedures outlined in the JSSA. Green thus outlined a means of
improving jury representativeness that did not run afoul of either equal
protection jurisprudence or congressional intent.
However, the Green remedy does not address the root causes of juror
exclusion in the district. Introducing second-round mailings does not add
viable addresses to incomplete eligible juror lists or encourage recalcitrant
eligible jurors to participate. These important sources of juror exclusion and,
allegedly, of racial imbalance will continue to warp venire compositions despite
the Green remedy. Consequently, the additional mailings will at best only
partially offset the alleged racial impact of errors in juror lists. Recognizing
this, Gertner considered whether her order should combat juror exclusion
directly, such as by requiring home visits to ascertain whether a lack of
response resulted from inaccurate address lists or noncompliance. But Gertner
rejected this remedial option because, in her view, "[t]he issue is not the
citizen's choice to be included in the jury selection system; it is the defendant's
right to a fair cross-sectional jury pool. ",162 Under an enfranchisement
approach, of course, the question of whether citizens are "included in the jury
selection system" is integral to a determination of fair cross-sectionality.
161. By contrast, some commentators have suggested the use of weighted mailings, whereby
regions containing disproportionate numbers of minorities would receive extra jury
summonses so as to increase the likelihood of a racially representative venire. See Nancy J.
King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section by Design, 79
JUDICATURE 273 (1996). A similar type of system was deemed unconstitutional in United
States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092 (6th Cir. 1998).
162. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
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Gertner's remark thus stands as a remarkably clear repudiation of an
enfranchisement conception of jury legitimacy in favor of a demographic one.
Yet Gertner struck a dramatically different note in a separately drafted
addendum to the order, issued after the parties and the public had received the
decision. Responding to the government's objections to the disseminated draft
order, Gertner argued that the Green remedy provides that "each person...
would have more of an equal chance of receiving a summons. '163 She further
argued that the JSSA "refers to a fair cross-section 'of the persons residing in the
community in the district or division wherein the court convenes"' and that the
remedy "maximizes the chances that 'persons' will have an equal opportunity
for access to this jury.' '164 By focusing on eligible jurors' "opportunity" and
"access," and not on the jury's demography, these passages imply that juror
inclusion is a legitimate value in itself. They further suggest that Gertner
believed the Green remedy was not simply a convenient means of increasing
black representation in juries, but rather a principled defense of an individually
held right. But how can second-round mailings, targeting particular zip codes
equalize individuals' access to jury service?
The answer to this question requires distinguishing between two types of
juror disenfranchisement. One could imagine a jury selection system that
absolutely excluded one subset of the population from jury service, much like
the way the computer error in Osorio and Jackman excluded residents of
Hartford and New Britain. If this were the situation in the district, then the
Green remedy would do little to enfranchise excluded jurors: individuals
chronically left off eligible juror lists would stand no greater chance of being
called by second mailings than by first ones. But there are also situations in
which a particular group is not absolutely but only comparatively excluded
from jury service. We could imagine, for example, that people who live in part
of a particular jurisdiction might receive jury summonses significantly less
frequently than do those in the rest of the area. This would constitute partial
jury disenfranchisement in that a particular subpopulation would be afforded
less of an opportunity to participate in juries. Most FCS claims cite partial
disenfranchisement, with the substantial underrepresentation prong
determining whether the alleged exclusion rises to the level of a constitutional
violation. As we saw in the preceding Section, the facts in Green may not have
satisfied that standard.
But just because a jury selection system meets constitutional strictures
does not mean that it fully achieves enfranchisement values. The record in
163. Id. at 78.
164. Id. at 79 n.8o (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 186 3 (b)( 3 )).
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RE-JUSTIFYING THE FAIR CROSS SECTION REQUIREMENT
Green strongly indicated that the district's jury selection system produced some
degree of partial disenfranchisement. Abramson expressed the point in his
report: "[A]II individuals have the 'opportunity' to be counted as residents of
their respective cities and towns[;] it is just that cities and towns
understandably fail to include everyone on their lists. It may be John Doe here
or this year or Ruth Doe there or next year. ",16' At the same time, Abramson
also noted repeatedly that "[t]he statistics do establish that the problem of
undeliverable summonses is greater than average when those summonses are
mailed to zip codes with high numbers of low income and African American
residents. ''166 So while every JSSA-required four-year refilling of the master
jury wheel may be more or less accurate, some zip codes disproportionately
contain people who have changed addresses within that four-year window.
Therefore, inhabitants of certain zip codes tend to face diminished prospects of
being called for jury service, even if they are not repeatedly overlooked when
eligible juror lists are updated. Second-round mailings counteract this disparity
by sending more summonses to these zip codes.
Viewed from this perspective, Green's zip-code-targeted "second-round
mailing" remedy is more than a convenient way of increasing black
representation in federal criminal venires. Indeed, the remedy also promotes
equal access to the jury franchise. In effect, second-round mailings strive to
compensate people whose addresses are temporarily undeliverable by offering
them an increased likelihood of being called for jury service in those years
when their current addresses are included on updated eligible juror lists. This
compensatory scheme highlights the differences between the jury and electoral
franchises. Because no eligible juror has a legal interest in participating in any
particular case, an eligible juror can be equally enfranchised whether she is
actually called for jury service today, next year, or the year after. Thus, to the
extent that Green's novel remedy over time equalizes the likelihood that district
residents will be called for jury service, it also promotes the constitutional value
of jury enfranchisement.
CONCLUSION
This Note's overarching goal has been to offer a justification of the FCS
requirement that is consonant with the legal values animating the American
criminal justice system. A commitment to juror enfranchisement, and not jury
demography, better comports with the metes and bounds of FCS doctrine,
16s. Abramson Report, supra note 156, at 54.
166. Id. at 4.
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important features of jury law and practice, equal protection jurisprudence, and
principles of impartiality and anti-essentialism. Therefore, an enfranchisement
approach to FCS doctrine best explains how the Sixth Amendment's invocation
of jury impartiality relates to Duren's cross-sectionality guarantee. At the same
time, current jury selection law and practice often fall short of what
enfranchisement values might command or commend. Courts in particular
should be mindffil of FCS doctrine's potential applicability in cases involving
quasi-permanent groups defined by traits like income or residential location.
An enfranchisement conception of jury legitimacy also has implications
beyond the four corners of FCS doctrine. FCS doctrine is best viewed as but
one manifestation of our society's abiding commitment to democracy in the
jury booth. Accordingly, nonconstitutional remedies, such as increased juror
compensation and the District of Massachusetts's second-round mailings,
should be praised for promoting enfranchisement ideals. Thus, while clarifying
past decisions and latent judicial intuitions, an enfranchisement approach also
invites a fresh perspective for the future.
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